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Commercial Transactions 
by Neil M. Levy* 
The emphasis of this article reflects the degree to which 
commercial law today is statutory. Particularly in California, 
where the Uniform Commercial Code has only been in effect 
since January 1, 1965, few cases construing that statute 
reached the appellate courts during the year 1967. How-
ever, the state legislature in 1967 amended 25 sections of 
the California Commercial Code. 1 Although these amend-
ments cover a wide range of substantive problems, they can 
be viewed in the light of the policy of the code as enunciated 
in section 1102(2) (c), "[t]o make uniform the law among 
the various jurisdictions." In addition, one group of these 
* A.B. 1963, Cornell University; J.D. 
1966, University of Chicago Law 
School. Assistant Professor, Golden 
Gate College, School of Law. Mem-
ber, New York State Bar. 
1. Amended were §§ 1201(17), 1202, 
1209, 1210, 2209(3)(4), 2403(4), 2719, 
2725, 3107, 3112(1)(b) and (c), 3506, 
5116(2), 6103, 7403(3), 7503, 7507, 
7508, 8105, 8106, 8304, 8313(3), 8320 
(5), 9104, 9301 and 9302. Senate Bill 
580 also amended Cal. Civ. Code 
§ 3440, dealing with fraudulent trans-
fers, to reconcile it with Division 9 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code. 
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amendments can best be analyzed by the effect upon freedom 
of contract. 
Uniformity and the Commercial Code 
Both the official texe and the California version of the 
Uniform Commercial Code state in section 1102(2): 
Underlying purposes and policies of this code are 
(a) To simplify, clarify and modernize the law gov-
erning commercial transactions; 
(b) To permit the continued expansion of commer-
cial practices through custom, usage and agree-
ment of the parties; 
(c) To make uniform the law among the various 
jurisdictions. 
As a text proposed for adoption in the various jurisdictions, 
these policies have general agreement. It is obvious that 
the more simple, clear, and modern the code, the greater the 
likelihood of adoption of a uniform commercial law in all of 
the states. When the proposed code is submitted to a partic-
ular state legislature, however, the various policies listed under 
subsection 1102(2) may be in conflict; the legislature may 
feel that the language of the official text can be further clari-
fied or that modern commercial practices call for different 
substantive rules of law. The state must then elect whether 
to give priority to the policy of conformity with the official 
text in order to achieve the desired uniformity. 3 
William A. Schnader, chairman of the Permanent Editorial 
Board4 for the Uniform Commercial Code, predictably is 
currently the leading spokesman for uniformity.s He denies 
2. The official text of the Uniform 
Commercial Code is the text promul-
gated by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
and the American Law Institute. 
3. For a discussion of the similar 
tensions in case development of the 
code, see VoId, Construing the Uniform 
Commercial Code: Its Own Twin Keys, 
Uniformity and Growth, 50 CORN L. Q. 
49 (1964). 
48 CAL LAW 1967 
4. For a brief description of the 
workings of the Permanent Editorial 
Board, see Schnader, The Permallent 
Editorial Board: Can It Accomplish Its 
Object?, 3 AM. Bus. L. J. 137 (1965). 
5. See Schnader, Why the Commer-
cial Code Should Be "Uniform", 20 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 237 (1963). 
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the need for state variations from the official text, even if 
those variations are intended merely to clarify language. As 
to minor variations, he states that the "amendments which 
were trivial may be said to have done no harm but it can 
be said with equal force that being trivial, they should not 
have been made."6 But this objection seems unconvincing; 
certainly the advantage to having uniform language in all 
the states is to build up a body of national authority for han-
dling difficult questions. But might not clarification of lan-
guage be a superior method of removing these difficulties? 
When considering major substantive variations, Schnader 
stresses, as additional support for his position, that large banks 
and sellers whose operations are national should not be forced 
to investigate the laws of 50 states in order to operate. Thus 
it seems clear, at least to Schnader, that uniformity is neces-
sary in order to ease the legal and operative burdens of large 
national concerns. Even conceding the importance of those 
concerns to our present economy, one may answer that ful-
filling their supposed needs is not the only legitimate function 
of a commercial code. 
Moreover, even if the official text of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code were to be adopted in all states, some local problems 
would remain for national concerns, since the code does not 
resolve all commercial problems. For example, the questions 
of the maximum interest rates allowed in each state and of 
the existence of special consumer legislation would still have 
to be carefully investigated. Yet, large national concerns, of 
course, have been able to survive despite these burdens. 
Schnader's trump card is that if the needs of large busi-
nesses are not met by the various states, then those businesses 
\V·ill demand and obtain a federal commercial code. He 
assumes that this result will be abhorrent to some who might 
otherwise favor some local variation. Nonetheless, one may 
question whether any advantage would be obtained by instead 
having each state "voluntarily" adopt the same code. Even 
if Schnader's assumptions regarding the wishes of business 
6. Schnader, 20 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
at 248. 
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firms7 and their power to obtain federal legislation are accu~ 
rate, one may still argue that it is closer to the rhetoric of 
American democracy for Congress to enact a federal commer-
cial code than for the nonelective Permanent Editorial Board 
to determine, in fact, the commercial law in the 50 states. 
One would, of course, be foolhardy to advocate ad hoc 
unstudied tinkering with the official text; certainly the caliber 
and energy of the contributors to the text should caution those 
who are attempting to improve it.s Moreover, because of the 
complexity and interlocking nature of the code, that which 
at first blush appears only to be a minor change may in fact 
have profound effects. Merit may also be found in a sugges-
tion of the board, apparently followed at least by New York 
State, that any proposed variation from the code first be 
submitted to the board. If this procedure does not unduly 
lengthen the time necessary for amendment, it seems an ideal 
manner in which to take advantage of the expertise of that 
board. 
When California first enacted the California Commercial 
Code, its version of the Uniform Commercial Code, it created 
120 variations from the official text-more than any other 
jurisdiction;9 apparently California lawmakers did not place 
great importance on the goal of conformity with the official 
text. However, the 1967 amendments to the California Com-
mercial Code numerically lessen the variations from the official 
text. Of the amendments that bring sections of the California 
code into conformity with the official text, some effect no 
substantive changes from the code as originally enacted in 
California, and only remove variations, the purpose of which 
had been greater clarity of text. lO However, several other 
amendments, which had been recommended by the Advisory 
7. Schnader's prediction may not even 
be accurate. As later discussed in this 
article, national business interests seem 
quite willing to urge local varations 
when a particular variation seems to be 
to their immediate advantage. 
8. Anyone who has ever found a sec-
tion of the code to be less than precise, 
50 CAL LAW 1967 
however, will enjoy reading Mellinkoff, 
The Language of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 77 YALE L. J. 185 (1967). 
9. See Schnader, 3 AM. Bus. L. J. at 
144. 
10. Cal. Com. Code §§ 2403(4), 
3112(b), 5116(2), 7403(3), 7507, 7508, 
8304 and 8320(5). 
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Committee to the (California) Senate on the Editorial Aspects 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, and which purported only 
to conform language, may, in fact, have substantively amended 
the code. For example, a 1967 addition to section 2209 
dealing with modification of contracts states, "The require-
ments of the statute of frauds section of this division . 
[sales] must be satisfied if the contract as modified 
is within its provisions." This provision, included in the 
official text, had been omitted from the California code as 
originally enacted. The Permanent Editorial Board/I as well 
as other commentators,I2 had pointed out that this omission 
could only have resulted from a failure by the California 
legislature to realize that the section deals with oral modifi-
cations of oral contracts. Although the amendment was 
therefore desirable in order to prevent the use of oral modifi-
cations of oral contracts to avoid the requirements of the 
statute of frauds, it is not certain that the same result would 
necessarily have been reached under the former language. IS 
Similarly, section 8313, a provision dealing with investment 
securities held in street names, was amended to conform to 
the official text. Although the Advisory Committee stated 
that no substantive change was intended,I4 the Permanent Edi-
torial Board had rejected the old California variation because 
it would "deprive a purchaser of needed protection from his 
broker. "15 
It may seem that once amendments to the California code 
are made, the question becomes moot whether the variation 
was a substantive change from the official text, unless a case 
has already arisen under the old language. However, with 
legislative history that states that no substantive change was 
intended, confusion may result from the argument that since 
11. Permanent Editorial Board for 
the Uniform Commercial Code, RE-
PORT ON VARIATIONS TO CODE IN ADOPT-
ING STATES, no. 2, p. 35 (1965). 
12. Coyne, Some Comments on Con-
tracts and the California Commercial 
Code, 1 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1966). 
13. Cal. Com. Code § 2209 still main-
tains some local variation. For a full 
discussion of problems raised by § 2209, 
see Laube, CONTRACTS, in this volume. 
14. SENATE JOURNAL, April 20, 1967, 
p. 1237. 
15. Permanent Editorial Board for 
the Uniform Commercial Code, REPORT 
ON VARIATIONS TO CODE IN ADOPTING 
STATES, no. 2, p. 157 (1965). 
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a certain result would have been obtained under the old 
language, the legislative intent is that the same result now 
be reached. 
Several other amendments, supposedly intended only to 
conform the California code, resulted even more clearly in 
substantive change. When the code was first enacted in Cali-
fornia, the statute of limitations section of Division 2, entitled 
"Sales," was omitted, leaving in effect the old California law. I6 
However, in this past year section 2725 was added. It is 
interesting to note that one reason for the addition of section 
2725 was to meet the Permanent Editorial Board's "lack of 
uniformity" objection. However, even proponents of uni-
formity feel that uniformity of procedural provisions is not 
at the top of the scale in importance. I7 
Section 2725, unlike the old law that had provided for a 
two-year limitation for oral sales contracts, now provides a 
four-year statute of limitations for all sales contracts, whether 
oral or written. The new law also makes explicit that although 
the period of limitation may be lessened by contract to one 
year, it cannot be extended by contract beyond the statutory 
period. Moreover, the code makes clear that with some 
exceptions,t8 the cause of action accrues at the time of breach, 
regardless of the "aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the 
breach." 
An amendment to section 3506 produced another substan-
tive change. In every other state, payment of an instrument 
16. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 337 and 
339. 
17. See Schnader, 3 AM. Bus. L. J. 
at 139. 
18. Cal. Com. Code § 2725. Breach 
of contract for sale; Limitation of Ac-
tions: Accrual of action: Time for 
bringing second action: Retrospective 
operation of section provides in part: 
(2) A cause of action accrues when 
the breach occurs, regardless of the ag-
grieved party's lack of knowledge of the 
breach. A breach of warranty occurs 
when tender of delivery is made, except 
that where a warranty explicitly extends 
52 CAL LAW 1967 
to future performance of the goods and 
discovery of the breach must await the 
time of such performance the cause of 
action accrues when the breach is or 
should have been discovered. 
(3) Where an action commenced with-
in the time limited by subdivision (1) 
i~ so terminated as to leave available a 
remedy by another action for the same 
breach such other action may be com-
menced after the expiration of the time 
limited and within six months after the 
termination of the first action unless the 
termination resulted from voluntary dis-
continuance or from dismissal for fail-
ure or neglect to prosecute. 
6
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must be made in a reasonable time from presentment, but in 
order to avoid dishonor, payment must be made "before the 
close of business on the day of presentment." In California, 
presumably because of the wide extent of branch banking, 
an additional day was originally allowed. Upon observing 
that no problems had arisen in the other states, the California 
legislature decided to conform the section to the official text. 
Only the passage of time will show whether local needs will 
be met by this provision. 
Another amendment substantially conforms section 7503, 
dealing with the entrusting of goods and documents of title, 
to the official text.19 When the code was originally adopted, 
California omitted the provision allowing rights in goods to 
be lost to the good-faith purchaser of a document of title if 
the owner of the goods "acquiesced in the procurement by 
the bailor or his nominee of any document of title." The 
provision was originally omitted from the California code 
because of fear engendered by the official comments that 
mere knowledge of the likelihood of shipping or storage might 
be enough to cut off the title of the original owner.20 The 
Permanent Editorial Board having stated that this was "an 
expansive reading,"! the Advisory Committee thereupon rec-
ommended that the provision be added. However, it is inter-
esting to note that the committee has indicated that the goal 
of uniformity has become more important than the original 
substantive problem with which the legislature had been con-
cerned. Legislative history is now added weight against the 
feared "expansive reading." But certainly there is more like-
lihood now, than under the old California language, of such 
an interpretation actually being made. 
Section 8105, which affirms that securities governed by 
Division 8 are negotiable instruments, was also amended in 
order to eliminate a California variation. The effect of this 
amendment will be greater in states other than California, 
19. The California Code, unlike the 
official text, does not mention delivery 
orders. 
20. See California Comments to 
Commercial Code § 7503. 
1. See Permanent Editorial Board for 
the Uniform Commercial Code, REPORT 
ON VARIATIONS TO CODE IN ADOPTING 
STATES, no. 2, pp. 138-139 (1965). 
CAL LAW 1967 53 
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since many states have so-called "legal investment" statutes, 
which require that securities that may be invested in by certain 
agents must be negotiable instruments. When California 
originally adopted the code, it was thought that since Cali-
fornia had no such requirement, this section should be elim-
inated so that there would be no possible confusion that 
sections of Division 3 of the code were thereby made appli-
cable. However, in 1967, the amendment was adopted to 
avert any possible problems regarding California securities 
that might arise in other states having such statutes. 
An amendment to section 8106 lessens the difference be-
tween the California and official text provisions governing 
conflicts of laws for investment securities. The official text 
simply states: 
The validity of a security and the rights and duties of 
the issuer with respect to registration of transfer are 
governed by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) 
of the jurisdiction of organization of the issuer. 
California's version, on the other hand, originally had exten-
sive provisions to allow California law to apply in many situ-
ations, even if the organization of the issuer were in a different 
jurisdiction. After the 1967 amendment, however, Cali-
fornia's provision more closely resembled the official text, 
stating: 
The validity of a security and the duty of an issuer to 
register a transfer (Section 8401) are governed by the 
law of the jurisdiction of organization of the issuer or, 
in the case of any national bank or other corporation 
organized under the laws of the United States, by the 
law of the jurisdiction in which such bank or other cor-
poration has its principal place of business. 
Even after this amendment, however, a problem raised by the 
Permanent Editorial Board is still not solved since 
the liability of an issuer for refusal to register a transfer 
might be governed by the law of the state of organiza-
54 CAL LAW 1967 
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tion while its liability for an improper registration would 
be governed by the law of California.2 
Similarly, subsection 9301 (3) was amended to provide that 
trustees in bankruptcy, assignees for the benefit of creditors, 
and receivers in equity shall be considered lien creditors. 
California originally did not enact this provision of the official 
text. 
However, the 1967 amendments do not all implement the 
goal of achieving accord with the official text. Section 9104, 
for example, was amended to an even further inconsistency 
with the official version in order to make clear the fact that 
Division 9 is not meant to apply to securities issued by public 
bodies. Although the California comment states that no 
substantive change is intended, the status of these securities 
in other states is not as clear as it is in California. Thus, the 
same act that, in some sections, eliminates variations based on 
earlier attempts to clarify, in other sections continues this 
same attempt at clarification. It is also interesting to note 
that the amendment to section 9104 was actually suggested 
by attorneys representing underwriters of these securities, a 
group that, according to Schnader's analysis, would oppose 
any local variations. 
The amendment of section 9302 eliminates one local varia-
tion, but imposes another. The section provides exceptions 
to the rule stating when a financing statement must be filed 
in order to perfect a security interest. The 1967 amendment 
eliminated the California variations, which had excepted as-
signments of claims against the United States, that had been 
made under federal assignment of claims statutes.3 However, 
the amendment now excepts "assignments for the benefit of 
all the creditors of the transferor, and subsequent transfers 
by the assignee thereunder," an exception not made in the 
official version. 
The principal group of amendments causing a variance 
between the California code and the official text reflects the 
2. Permanent Editorial Board for the 
Uniform Commercial Code, REPORT ON 
VARIATIONS TO CODE IN ADOPTING 
STATES, no. 2, pp. 144-145 (1965). 
3. 31 U.S.C. § 203; 41 U.S.C. § 15. 
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attempt to harmonize the California Commercial Code with 
the new California Evidence Code.4 
Throughout the official text of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, presumptions are raised. Section 1-201 (31) states: 
"Presumption" or "presumed" means that the trier of 
fact must find the existence of the fact presumed unless 
and until evidence is introduced which would support 
a finding of its nonexistence. 
For example, section 3-114(3) states, "Where the instrument 
or any signature thereon is dated, the date is presumed to be 
correct." Thus, if a payee of a note places that note in evi-
dence, and no contrary evidence is presented, the date that 
the maker signed on the note must be accepted as the date 
when the note was made. However, neither the code nor 
the comments state what effect the presumption raised will 
have if the maker brings forth some evidence that the date 
written was not the actual date of the note, or who will have 
the ultimate burden of proof of the issue. Because of this 
ambiguity, and the knowledge that a new evidence code 
was being studied, the legislature originally refused to adopt 
section 1-201 (31) ,5 leaving undefined, until the 1967 amend-
ment, the word "presumption," used so often throughout the 
code. 
The California Evidence Code very neatly deals with pre-
sumptions.6 Section 601 simply states: "Every rebuttable 
presumption is either (a) a presumption affecting the burden 
of producing evidence or (b) a presumption affecting the 
burden of proof." The code then goes on to draw guidelines 
by which judges may determine how to treat any given pre-
sumption. Section 603 states that presumptions affecting the 
burden of producing evidence are those that have been enacted 
solely "to facilitate the determination of the particular action 
in which the presumption is applied," while section 605 defines 
4. See generally, Note, The Law of 
Evidence in the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 1 GA. L. REV. 44 (1966). 
5. See California Comments to Com-
mercial Code § 1201(31). 
56 CAL LAW 1967 
6. The California Commercial Code 
uses only the concept of the rebuttable 
presumption, and does not use the con-
cept of the conclusive presumption. 
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a burden of proof presumption as one "established to imple-
ment" some other public policy. 
However, the California Law Revision Commission was 
unwilling to allow the various presumptions raised by the 
Commercial Code to be classified judicially according to these 
broad standards.7 Instead, upon their recommendation, the 
legislature categorized the specific presumptions of the Com-
mercial Code so that there would be predictability without 
the necessity of first having a judicial determination.8 
The central provision dealing with this problem in the 
Commercial Code is section 1210,9 which states, "Except 
as otherwise provided in Section 1202, the presumptions estab-
lished by this code are presumptions affecting the burden of 
producing evidence." Section 604 of the Evidence Code, 
then, makes clear that the trier of fact must assume "the 
existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is 
introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence. 
" The Evidence Code goes on, however, to clarify 
what section 1-201 (31) leaves unclear: if evidence is intro-
duced that would support a finding of the nonexistence of the 
presumed fact, "the trier of fact shall determine the existence 
or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and 
without regard to the presumption," although he may draw 
appropriate inferences. 
Section 1202 represents the one provision in the code where 
the legislature this year created a burden of proof presump-
tion.lo Subsection (2) creates a presumption affecting the 
7. California Law Revision Commis-
sion Recommendation: Related to the 
Evidence Code, No.3-Commercial 
Code Revisions, October 1966, p. 309. 
8. The report at one point (p. 307) 
states that one reason why a legislative 
determination is desirable is because 
"the general standards provided in the 
Evidence Code do not permit ready clas-
sification of all the presumptions in the 
Commercial Code." The report then 
goes on to state (p. 308) that in most 
cases it is relatively easy to determine 
the intent of the drafters of the Uniform 
Code, though admittedly in a few cases 
it would be difficult to determine how 
the drafters would have classified the 
presumptions based on the California 
Evidence Code. Note the optimism of 
the comment in saying that the amend-
ment is not a substantive change from 
the official text. 
9. This section was recommended by 
the California Law Revision Commis-
sion as § 1209. 
10. Certain other provisions in the 
code affect burden of proof without the 
CAL LAW 1967 57 
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burden of producing evidence, that such documents as bills 
of lading are presumed to be authenticll and genuine. How-
ever, if a document is found to be authentic and genuine, 
either through this presumption or otherwise, a presumption 
affecting the burden of proof is then raised that the facts 
stated in that document are true. Because of section 606 of 
the Evidence Code, a party claiming that the facts are in-
correct must therefore bear the burden of proof on that 
issue; that is, he must by a preponderance of the evidence 
convince the trier of fact that the stated information is untrue. 
There was one other amendment dealing with burdens. 
California originally enacted the official text of section 2719, 
dealing with contractual modification or limitation of remedy. 
Section 2719 (3) stated: 
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded un-
less the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Lim-
itation of consequential damages for injury to the person 
in the case of consumer goods is prima facie uncon-
scionable but limitation of damages where the loss is 
commercial is not. 
The 1967 amendment, by stating that "[l]imitation of conse-
quential damages for injury to the person in the case of 
consumer goods is invalid unless it is proved that the limita-
tion is not unconscionable," eliminates the use of the prima 
facie concept while retaining the distinction between com-
mercial and noncommercial loss. Limitation of consequential 
damages where the loss is commercial is, however, still valid 
unless it is proved that the limitation is unconscionable.12 
concept of presumptions. See § 3307 
(l)(a). 
11. Section 1202 was also amended 
to make clear that the presumption only 
applies in actions concerning the con-
tract that authorized the document. 
12. Although this provision was 
enacted as recommended by the com-
mission in order "to clarify the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof," it is in-
teresting that the legislature did not see 
58 CAL LA W 1967 
fit to accept another recommendation of 
the commission, that § 4103, relating to 
a bank's responsibility for failure to ex-
ercise ordinary care, also be amended 
to remove the prima facie concept. Al-
though the commission itself was unsure 
whether, under § 602 of the Evidence 
Code, a presumption was created, the 
comment to § 1210 merely stated that 
no rebuttable presumption was created. 
It is difficult to see why tb,~ Ian~a¥« 
12
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The Uniform Commercial Code and the Law of Contracts 
The spheres of the Commercial Code and the traditional 
law of contracts obviously overlap. Section 1102(3) spe~ 
cifically states: 
The effect of provisions of this code may be varied by 
agreement, except as otherwise provided in this code 
and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, 
reasonableness and care prescribed by this code may not 
be disclaimed by agreement. [Emphasis added.] 
However, in order to determine whether any specific contrac~ 
tual agreement will be given effect, a court has to interpret 
the phrase "except as otherwise provided." An examination 
of one of the 1967 amendments will be a helpful illustration. 
The code makes use of the concept of fungible goods and 
states in section 1201 (17), " 'Fungible' with respect to goods 
or securities means goods or securities of which any unit is, 
by nature or usage of trade, the equivalent of any other like 
unit." It would seem then, merely because of the definition, 
that one could not simply contract to call nonfungible goods 
fungible, even though there is no specific language in the 
code against doing so. But the 1967 amendment, conforming 
the California text to the official text, now provides: 
Goods which are not fungible shall be deemed fungible 
for the purposes of this code to the extent that under 
a particular agreement or document unlike units are 
treated as equivalents. 
Thus it is now clear that parties may contract to deem goods 
fungible whenever this suits their purpose. 
Similarly, an amendment to subsection 3107 (2) makes it 
clear that a negotiable instrument may require payment in a 
foreign currency. Thus, parties once again are given more 
leeway in their financial arrangements. 
However, the amendment to section 3112(c), due at least 
in part to legislative confusion about this section, restricts 
of § 4103 should be treated differently guage, assuming it is not to be treated 
from the language of § 2719, and it is as a rebuttable presumption. 
difficult to know the effect of the lan-
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the right of parties to include certain clauses in an instrument 
and still have that instrument considered negotiable. Section 
3104(1) states: 
Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this 
division must . . . [c]ontain an unconditional prom-
ise or order to pay a sum certain in money and no other 
promise except as authorized by this division. 
. . . [Emphasis added.] 
Section 3112 is the primary section that states those other 
promises that may be made. 
Subsection 3112(c) of the official text states that "a prom-
ise or power to maintain or protect collateral or to give addi-
tional collateral" does not destroy negotiability. As originally 
enacted, the same subsection in the California code had 
allowed, in addition, and without affecting negotiability, a 
promise or power 
to furnish financial information or to do or refrain from 
doing any other act for the protection of the obligation 
expressed in the instrument not involving the payment 
of money on account of the indebtedness evidenced by 
the instrument. 
The Permanent Editorial Board rejected this variation 
fearing that on the one hand, it would open the door to "an 
indefinite number of possibly long and complex provisions 
. . .,"13 and on the other hand, the provision was so vague as 
to offer little guidance as to which provisions would be valid 
and which not. 
Somehow, in the 1967 amendment the phrase "to give addi-
tional collateral," rather than the objectionable portion, was 
eliminated. The California Code comment to section 3112 
states that this was due to "an error resulting from the process 
of amendment."14 Therefore, because of the error, it is impos·· 
13. Permanent Editorial Board for 
the Uniform Commercial Code, REPORT 
ON VARIATIONS TO CODE IN ADOPTING 
STATES, no. 2, p. 56 (1965). 
14. Although the California Com-
ment states that the Advisory Commit-
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tee had recommended that the section 
be amended to conform to the official 
text, such recommendation does not ap-
pear in the official report of that com-
mittee. 
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sible to state whether an instrument giving the payee the 
right to demand additional collateral is negotiable. It can 
be argued that since the code provision permitting such a 
clause was specifically excluded from the section, the right 
to put in the clause has been eliminated. It can also be argued, 
however, that the right to do so is still plainly included in 
the objectionable clause. It would seem that until the legis-
lature corrects its error, the latter is the more desirable result, 
considering that this useful commercial procedure15 is allowed 
in all other states. 
Another section adopted in 1967 was section 1209, dealing 
with subordinate agreements. After studying this provision, 
which began as a New York variation, the Permanent Edi-
torial Board recommended it for optional amendment.16 By 
the language of the section itself, it is deemed to be merely 
declaratory of the existing law. It allows the highly useful 
commercial technique of allowing one party to subordinate 
his rights, in case of insolvency, to another, and states that 
the mere fact of such an agreement does not per se create a 
security agreement. Thus the parties are free to create this 
"halfway house," rather than be forced to choose between 
having no priority or creating a security interest. 
Finally, section 6103 was amended to a greater degree 
of inconsistency with the official text, although the amend-
ment may also be considered as giving more freedom to con-
tract. It excludes from Division 6, dealing with bulk sales, 
all assignments for the benefit of creditors. Thus, partial 
assignments may be exempted from the requirements that the 
official text places on them. The official text only excludes 
"general assignments for the benefit of all the creditors. " 
Case Law-Negotiation of Checks17 
Three cases dealing with negotiation of checks were decided 
during the reported period. Of greater significance than the 
15. Of course, different issues are pre- REPORT ON VARIATIONS TO CODE IN 
sented when a note is given in return ADOPTING STATES, no. 3, p. 11 (1966). 
for consumer goods. 17. Other cases that involve some 
16. See Permanent Editorial Board aspects of the Uniform Commercial 
for the Uniform Commercial Code, Code are treated in this volume in 
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substantive holdings, however, was the manner in which the 
court treated the newly enacted code. To a great extent, the 
code was treated as a reenactment and rephrasing of pre-code 
law. In view of a natural desire by judges (and lawyers) to 
work with the familiar, this approach is understandable. 
When deciding one case in which the code governed, the 
court of appeal meticulously attempted to show that the 
code did not even deal with the problem presented. IS Par-
adoxically, during this period of transition, a court of appeal 
of the same district, deciding a difficult case under pre-code 
law, relied on the code as persuasive authority, since it felt 
the result was clearer under the code. In so deciding, the 
court presupposed that no change from pre-code law could 
have been intended in the code.19 
In Harry H. White Lumber Co. v. Crocker-Citizens National 
Bank,20 the court of appeal, was reluctant to use the code as 
a means to decide afresh an old question of law. The question 
presented and answered affirmatively by the court was: 
Does a joint payee of a check have a cause of action 
against a collecting bank which has paid a check made 
payable to joint payees bearing an indorsement effected 
by one joint payee signing his own name and forging 
that of his joint payee?l 
There were four checks involved, and since two were drawn 
before the effective date of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
and two afterwards, the court had to apply both old and new 
law. It seems more important for purposes of discussion, 
however, to concentrate on the court's solution under the 
code. 
The issue presented to the court had two facets. First, 
the court had to decide whether the joint payee had any cause 
of action. If it found that he did, then the court would have 
Laube, CONTRACTS, and McIntosh, REAL First Nat'l. Bank, 248 Cal. App.2d 75, 
PROPERTY. 56 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1967). 
18. Harry H. White Lumber Co. v. 20. 253 Cal. App.2d 423, 61 Cal. 
Crocker-Citizens Nat'l. Bank, 253 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1967). 
App.2d 423, 61 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1967). 1. 253 Cal. App.2d at 425, 61 Cal, 
19. Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Security Rptr. at 382. 
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to inquire whether that action could be maintained against 
the collecting bank. 
The court's reasoning is clear on the first question. Section 
3116 states: "An instrument payable to the order of two 
or more persons . . . [i]f not in the alternative is payable 
to all of them and may be negotiated, discharged or enforced 
only by all of them." The forgery by one joint payee does 
not alter the rights of the other, since section 3404(1) states, 
"Any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of 
the person whose name is signed. " Since section 
1201 (43) states that" '[u]nauthorized' signature or indorse-
ment means one made without actual, implied or apparent 
authority and includes a forgery," the only possible conclusion 
is that the joint payee did have a cause of action under the 
code. 
The court thereupon had to face the more difficult question 
of whether the joint payee could bring that action against the 
collecting bank. The court quoted from the code, as follows: 
Section 3306: "Unless he has the rights of a holder in 
due course any person takes the instrument subject to 
( d) The defense that he holds the 
instrument. by theft. " Section 3419: 
"(1) An instrument is converted when (c) It 
is paid on a forged indorsement."2 
The court then citing, but not quoting, the comments to sec-
tions 3404 and 3 419, concluded that although section 3419 
gives the payee of a forged check a cause of action against 
the drawee bank, "no change is indicated as to preexisting 
California case law permitting the payee to recover from a 
collecting bank which has paid out on a forged endorsement."3 
Although the comments do not indicate any change, neither 
2. 253 Cal. App. 2d at 428, 61 Cal. 
Rptr. at 385. 
3. 253 Cal. App.2d at 430, 61 Cal. 
Rptr. at 386. Curiously, the court relied 
on Stone & Webster v. First Nat'!. Bank 
& Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 
358, 99 A.L.R.:2d 628 (1962). Stone 
was an action by a drawer against the 
collecting bank. In it, the court also 
felt that the code effected no change, 
but old law in Massachusetts had not 
allowed the action. Moreover, the 
court in Stone carefully considered the 
policy questions involved. 
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do they address themselves to this issue. The court's result 
can only be reached by assuming that "paid" refers only to 
an action by a drawee bank, a conclusion certainly not made 
clear in the code. But the court concluded that the code 
did give the payee a cause of action against the collecting 
bank. 
It is unfortunate that the court in White did not use the 
opportunity, in facing this issue for the first time under the 
code, to discuss whether granting an action against a collect-
ing bank is desirable. Certainly section 3419 ( c) can be read 
broadly enough to reach a conclusion contrary to that reached 
by the court. The court then could have balanced the com-
peting interests involved. In favor of allowing the action 
against the collecting bank would be the argument that the 
joint payee would thus be permitted to avoid a multiplicity 
of actions, since a forger who steals a series of checks drawn 
on a number of banks is likely to cash them at the same bank. 
Moreover, circuity of action would be avoided, since the payee 
would otherwise have to sue the drawee, who would in turn 
sue the collecting bank for breach of warranty under section 
4207. On the other hand, it can be argued that the thrust 
of Divisions 3 and 4 is against allowing the actions, since 
these divisions generally lessen the responsibility of collecting 
banks. Even more important than the disposition of this 
particular problem, however, is that courts should use the 
occasion of deciding a case for the first time under the code 
as an opportunity to re-reason old problems. 
In Pacific Indemnity Company v. Security First National 
Bank,4 a case where old law was clearly applicable, the major-
ity reached a result that seemed even more clearly warranted 
under the code. The court then reasoned that since no 
change was intended, the code's solution could be used as 
persuasive authority. 
The facts of the case are complicated and, as the court 
of appeal pointed out, the record does not adequately disclose 
them. Certain facts, however, are clear. Brown was an 
4. 248 Cal. App.2d 75, 56 Cal. Rptr. 
142 (1967). 
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employee of Credit Managers, a firm "engaged in the business 
of administering the affairs and assets of various businesses 
which had made assignments to it for the benefit of creditors."5 
Brown, making use of the firm's checkwriting machine, caused 
numerous checks payable to the defendant bank to be drawn. 
Even though notations on the front of these checks indicated 
that they were being given for payment in full of various 
debts supposedly owed to the defendant bank, the defendant 
allowed Brown to place these checks, which were drawn on 
another bank, into his personal checking account. Under the 
terms of a fidelity bond, Credit Managers' indemnity company 
reimbursed Credit Managers for losses they could not recover 
from Brown, and then sued the defendant for the loss. At 
the trial, evidence was presented that showed that the bank 
had not followed its usual precautions with these checks. 
Evidence was also presented from which it could be inferred 
that Credit Managers was remiss in its auditing procedures. 
The superior court found for the defendant, but the court 
of appeal reversed. 
In a rather lengthy opinion, Justice Herndon attempted to 
dispel what he felt was an error that the trial court had made, 
and that the dissent was trying to perpetuate. The trial court 
had applied the so-called fictitious payee rule. That rule is 
embodied in former Civil Code section 30906 and currently 
appears in § 34057 of the Commercial Code. It protects the 
drawee bank from suffering loss when an employee pads the 
payroll of his employer, who has an account at that bank. 
As Justice Herndon pointed out, and the concurrence made 
clear, this case presents a different circumstance. Here the 
bank was the payee of the check. The fraud of the employee 
5. 248 Cal. App.2d at 79, 56 Cal. 
Rptr. at 145. 
6. Stats. 1917 c. 751, p. 1534, § 1, as 
amended Stats. 1945 c. 658, p. 1315 § 1. 
7. Cal. Comm. Code § 3405 provides: 
(1) An indorsement by any person in 
the name of a named payee is effective 
if: 
(a) An imposter by use of the mails 
or otherwise has induced the maker or 
5 
drawer to issue the instrument to him 
or his confederate in the name of the 
payee; or 
(b) A person signing as or on behalf 
of a maker or drawer intends the payee 
to have no interest in the instrument; 
or 
(c) An agent or employee of the mak-
er or drawer has supplied him with the 
name of the payee intending the latter 
to have no such interest. 
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was completed because of the bank's carelessness in letting 
funds it received leave its hands. Therefore, Justice Herndon 
concluded that as against the employer, the bank should suffer 
the burden of being bound by the notations on the face of 
the checks. 
The court then had to consider whether the paid surety 
had the same equities, vis-a.-vis the bank, as the employer 
would have had. It implied that since the bank was not totally 
innocent,S it could not therefore maintain that the indemnitor 
should bear the burden. However, the court did not clearly 
state whether a bank would be liable any time it was negligent, 
or only liable when its negligence was greater than that of 
the insured party. 
Once again, the court's approach was more significant than 
its holding. The court quoted: 
"Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code is a revision 
and reorganization of the existing Uniform Negotiable 
Instruments Law now found in our Civil Code. While 
new language has been used, the changes from the exist-
ing NIL are not too great and to all intents and purposes 
it may be said that the law in this area remains the 
same." (Sixth Progress Report to the Legislature by 
Senate Fact Finding Committee on Judiciary (1959-
1961) Part I, the Uniform Commercial Code, pp. 342-
343.)9 
Even the dissent felt compelled to offer his tentative belief 
that the code did not change prior law!lO 
Nonetheless, it might be helpful to look at the one other 
indorsement case that reached the court of appeal this year, 
and to see how counsel might have argued for an opposite 
result if the code, rather than pre-code law, had been appli-
cable. 
8. The court thus distinguished Mey-
ers v. Bank of America, 11 Cal.2d 92, 
77 P.2d 1084 (1938). 
66 CAL LAW 1967 
9. 248 Cal. App.2d at 92, 56 Cal. 
Rptr. at 153. 
10. 248 Cal. App.2d at 105, 56 Cal. 
Rptr. at 161. 
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In Cameron v. Security First National Bank,Il the plaintiffs, 
Mr. and Mrs. Cameron, received a check as joint payees. At 
that time, the plaintiffs had a joint savings account with the 
bank. The husband was also authorized to sign at the same 
bank for the checking account of Amber Construction Com-
pany, of which he was a primary stockholder and officer. 
Shortly before the Camerons received the check, an officer 
of the bank had notified Mr. Cameron's secretary that the 
account of Amber Construction Company was overdrawn. 
The secretary replied that Mr. Cameron was expecting a 
check and would cover the deficit when it arrived. When 
the check in question did arrive, the Camerons indorsed it 
and wrote "For Deposit Only" under their signatures. After-
wards, the secretary placed the number of the Amber account 
under the signature. 
When the secretary arrived at the bank to deposit the check, 
a bank officer, noting that the check was jointly payable to 
the Camerons rather than to Amber, stated, "This appears 
like Mr. Cameron may have wanted this to go into his own 
account."12 Although the secretary said that such was not 
the case, the officer attempted to call Mr. Cameron. Since 
Cameron could not be reached, the officer accepted the check 
for the Amber account. 
Seven months later, after his association with Amber had 
ended, Cameron and his wife sued the bank for failure to 
honor the restrictive indorsement. The court of appeal af-
firmed the decision of the trial court, which had found that 
the bank had no notice of any defect, that the secretary had 
ostensible authority to deposit the check in the Amber ac-
count, that the bank was an innocent party, and that since 
plaintiffs had been negligent, they must bear the responsibility 
of the secretary's act. 
There is no reason to suspect that applicable principles 
concerning the agency of the secretary should be considered 
changed by the code. Section 1103 specifically states: "Un-
less displaced by the particular provisions of this code, the 
11. 251 Cal. App.2d 450, 59 Cal. 12. 251 Cal. App.2d at 454--455, 59 
Rptr. 563 (1967). Cal. Rptr. at 566. 
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principles of principal and agent shaH 
supplement its provisions." 
Section 3206(3) on the effect of restrictive indorsements 
then provides: 
Except for an intermediary bank, any transferee under 
an indorsement which is conditional or includes the 
words "for collection," "for deposit," "pay any bank," 
or like terms (paragraphs (a) and (c) of Section 3205) 
must payor apply any value given by him for or on 
the security of the instrument consistently with the in-
dorsement, and to the extent that he does so he becomes 
a holder for value. In addition such transferee is a 
holder in due course if he otherwise complies with the 
requirements of Section 3302 on what constitutes a 
holder in due course. 
With the secretary considered the agent of the Camerons 
for purposes of signing the account number, the problem still 
remains, however, of whether the bank took with notice of 
defect in the instrument and thus should be responsible for 
the loss. In deciding the case, the court had interpreted 
section 313713 of the old Civil Code to narrowly restrict what 
would be considered notice. In keeping with the usual inter-
pretation of that section, the court quoted from Christian v. 
California Bank.·a 
Under this section [Civ.Code, § 3137] it is the well-
settled rule that "mere knowledge of facts sufficient to 
put a prudent man on inquiry, without actual knowledge, 
or mere suspicion of an infirmity or defect of title, does 
not preclude the transferee from occupying the position 
of a holder in due course, unless the circumstances or 
suspicions are so cogent and obvious that to remain pas-
sive would amount to bad faith. [T]his rule is 
13. Stats. 1917, c. 751, p. 1541 § 1. 
To constitute notice of an infirmity in 
the instrument or defect in the title of 
the person negotiating the same, the 
person to whom it is negotiated must 
have had actual knowledge of the in-
68 CAL LAW 1967 
firmity or defect, or knowledge of such 
facts that his action in taking the in-
strument amounted to bad faith. 
14. 30 Ca1.2d 421, 182 P.2d 554 
(1947). 
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subject to the qualification that 'where the circumstances 
are such as to justify the conclusion that the failure to 
make inquiry arose from a suspicion that inquiry would 
disclose a vice or defect in the instrument or transaction, 
such indorsee is charged with knowledge.' "15 
However, Commercial Code section 1201 (25) leaves open 
the possibility of more liberal findings of notice. That section 
provides: 
A person has "notice" of a fact when (a) He has actual 
knowledge of it; or (b) He has received a notice or 
notification of it; or (c) From all the facts and circum-
stances known to him at the time in question he has 
reason to know that it exists. 
From the language of this section it would appear that Cam-
eron could argue that from all the facts and circumstances 
known to it, and as evidenced by its attempt to contact 
Cameron by telephone, the bank had reason to know of the 
defect. 
This interpretation of section 1201 (25) might lead to a 
desirable result. However, it is doubtful that the courts 
would accept it in view of their reluctance to use the code 
to change old results. Moreover, a counterargument could 
be made that the code was not meant to revive this objective 
test, but to retain the so-called subjective test of notice in 
fact. 16 
Consumer Credit 
Commercial law today is increasingly regulated by statutes 
that deal with the problems of consumer credit; intensive 
attention is being paid to the practice of consumer purchase 
of goods through instalment contracts. 17 California's basic 
statutory scheme deals with the purchase of motor vehicles 
15. 251 Cal. App.2d at 458, 59 Cal. 17. See Symposium, 8 BaST. CaLL. 
Rptr. at 568. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 387 (1967); 
16. See Littlefield, Good Faith Pur- Note, Consumer Legislation and the 
chase of Consumer Paper: The Failure Poor, 76 YALE L. REV. 745, 746 (1967). 
of the Subjective Test, 39 So. CAL. L. 
R€.v. 48 at 56-60 (1966). 
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under the Rees-Levering Actl8 and with the purchase of all 
other consumer goods under the Unruh Act.l9 The year 1967 
brought amendments to both of these acts. 
Rees-Levering Act20 
Several attempts were made by the legislature to fill loop-
holes that sellers had discovered in the statute and had capi-
talized upon. The first such amendment governs section 
2983 of the Civil Code, which deals with the amount recover-
able by the buyer when a conditional sales contract is held 
to be unenforceable because it violates either subsection 2982 
(a), dealing with formal requirements, or section 2982(c), 
dealing with finance charges. 
The original 1945 Automobile Sales Act had simply stated 
that the amount recoverable would be "three times the total 
amount paid on the contract balance."l However, that phrase 
caused confusion when the purchaser had traded in one auto-
mobile as part of the purchase price of another. In City 
Lincoln-Mercury Company v. Lindsey,2 the supreme court 
held that to determine "the total amount paid," the auto-
mobile traded in should be valued at its actual value rather 
than at the presumably fictitious trade-in value. Thus, after 
that decision, a seller could overvalue trade-ins, in order to 
increase market appeal, without fear of loss if the contract 
18. Automobile Sales Finance Act, 
Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2981-2984.3. 
19. Retail Installment Sales Act, Cal. 
Civ. Code §§ 1801-1812.10. 
In addition, of course, the Civil Code 
also deals specifically with certain other 
business practices. For example, one 
1967 act (see Cal. Civ. Code § 1716) 
forbids sending to a potential customer 
"any writing that could reasonably be 
interpreted as a statement or invoice, 
for goods not yet ordered or for services 
not yet performed and not yet ordered, 
unless there appears on the face of the 
statement or invoice or writing in 30-
point boldface type the following warn-
ing: 
This is a solicitation for the order of 
70 CAL LAW 1967 
goods or services and you are under no 
obligation to make payment unless you 
accept the offer contained herein." 
20. For articles discussing the Rees-
Levering Act, see Recent Legislation 
-The Rees-Levering Motor Vehicle 
Sales & Finance Act, 10 UCLA L. REv. 
125 (1962); Selected 1960-1961 Cal-
ifornia Legislation, 36 CAL. S. BAR J. 
688 (1961). 
1. Stats. 1945 c. 1030, p. 1993, § 9 
(c). 
2. 52 Ca1.2d 267, 339 P.2d 851, 73 
A.L.R.2d 1420 (1959); see also 
G.M.A.C. v. Kyle, 54 Cal.2d 101, 4 Cal. 
Rptr. 496, 351 P.2d 768 (1960). 
3. Stats. 1961 c. 1626, p. 3538, § 4. 
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proved unenforceable. In 1961, however, the legislature 
changed this result by providing: 
The amount recoverable for property traded in as all 
or part of the down payment shall be equal to the agreed 
cash value of such property as the value appears in the 
conditional sale contract.3 
The consumer was then relieved from having to prove actual 
value; rather, he could rely on the stated value. 
However, some sellers were quick to adjust to the new 
statute and to realize that by inducing the buyer to accept 
an artificially low trade-in value and giving a corresponding 
reduction in the sales price, they could place themselves in an 
advantageous position if the contract proved to be unenforce-
able. The 1967 amendment to section 2983 now gives the 
buyer adequate protection, stating: 
The amount recoverable for property traded in as all or 
part of the down payment shall be equal to the agreed 
cash value of such property as the value appears on the 
conditional sale contract or the fair market value of such 
property as of the time the contract is made, whichever is 
greater. 
In addition to protecting the purchaser if the contract proves 
unenforceable, this provision will also encourage the seller 
to value the trade-ins as closely as possible to the actual value. 
The amendment will thus have some aspects of a truth-in-
lending bill, in that the buyer will be able to get a better idea 
of the true economic cost of the new car since the seller 
will be encouraged to give an accurate estimate of the value 
of the automobile that the buyer is trading in. 
Civil Code section 2984.2 was also amended as an attempt 
to fill another feared loophole. However, the success of this 
change was only partial. The 1961 amendment to the act 
had prevented a seller from taking either title to, or a lien on, 
real or personal property other than the subject matter of 
the sale, in connection with the conditional sale of an auto-
mobile. However, some sellers attempted to evade the plain 
import of the act by urging the buyer to negotiate a loan 
CAL LAW 1967 71 
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from a loan company that had an "understanding" with the 
seIler, giving land or other property for coIlateral on that 
loan, and then, with the money borrowed, complete "an out-
right sale" of the automobile.4 
Senate BiII 778 was passed to remedy this situation. As 
first proposed, the bill would have made unenforceable, to 
the same extent as an agreement for conditional sale, any 
agreement in connection with a sale of an automobile. Prob-
ably because of fear that a lender who was not aware of the 
use of a loan might find himself with an unenforceable con-
tract, the bill as finaIly enacted merely makes unenforceable 
such agreements between the buyer and the seller. 
However, assuming that one of the primary evils that Rees-
Levering is trying to prevent is that of a buyer losing valuable 
assets through defaulting on payment for a car, one wonders 
how effective this amendment will be. Although a buyer 
may be able to have his contract with the seIler rescinded, 
he will have given the security interest to another party. 
Although the amendment may deter seIlers from trying to 
arrange such transactions, even if one feels that good-faith 
lenders' agreements should be held enforceable, might it not 
be preferable to aIlow buyer rescission of the contract with 
the lender, at least when lender knowledge is shown?5 
Another change, though of a more limited nature, was 
effected by amending section 2983.2 of the Civil Code, which 
deals with the notice that must be given on the sale of a 
repossessed automobile. The time of notice was doubled, 
so that at least 10 days' notice must now be given to anyone 
liable on the conditional sales contract. This is extended to 
20 days if the notice is given to someone outside of the state. 
AdditionaIly, section 2983.2 now states that notice may be 
"personaIly served or shaIl be sent by certified mail, return 
receipt requested." 
4. Of course, even under the act as 
it existed before the 1967 amendments, 
one could not rule out the possibility 
that a court would look to the substance 
of the transaction if it felt that the loan 
was, in fact, from the seHer. 
72 CAL I-AW 1967 
S. See Littlefield, Good Faith Pur-
chase of Consumer Paper: The Failure 
of the Subjective Test, 39 So. CAL. L. 
REV. 48 (1966), for the possible inter-
relation of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. 
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In addition to these legislative changes, several cases helped 
to clarify the Rees-Levering Act. In San Jose Autocar White 
Co. v. Williamson,6 the purchaser of two trailer trucks sought 
protection of the Rees-Levering provisions, even though the 
trucks had been bought for a commercial purpose. Despite 
defendant's argument that the act was designed to protect 
"an unsophisticated individual buyer purchasing from a 
sophisticated seller",7 the court refused to depart from the 
plain meaning of the statute, which limits application to 
any vehicle required to be registered under the Vehicle 
Code which is bought for use primarily for personal or 
family purposes, and does not mean any vehicle which 
is bought for use primarily for business or commercial 
purposes.s 
The court went on to buttress its argument, finding that 
although the original Automobile Sales Act of 1945 did not 
exclude commercial sales, one purpose of the 1961 amend-
ments was to limit the purview of the act by the purpose of 
the purchaser rather than by the magnitude of the sale. Con-
ceding the appealing nature of defendant's argument, if 
addressed to the legislature, it is difficult to see how the court 
could have accepted it in the face of the statutory language. 
In Highway Trailer v. Frankel,9 the court of appeal af-
firmed a trial court's determination that a contract was un-
enforceable as to the unpaid balance because, on the contract, 
the sum listed for cash downpayment included a postdated 
check. lO The court held that this violated section 2982(2) 
of the Civil Code, which requires that the contract set forth 
[t]he amount of the buyer's down payment, and whether 
made in cash or represented by the net agreed value 
of described property traded in, or both, together with 
6. 249 Cal. App.2d 619, 57 Cal. Rptr. 
692 (1967). 
7. 249 Cal. App.2d at 621, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. at 694. 
8. Cal. Civ. Code § 2981(j). 
9. 250 Cal. App.2d 733, 58 Cal. Rptr. 
883 (1967). 
10. Even though the court was deal-
ing with law existing before the 1967 
amendment, the issue confronting the 
court would be similarly decided if the 
facts arose today. 
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a statement of the respective amounts credited for cash 
and for such property. 
The court thus extended a decision previously reached 
by an appellate court in the case of Bratta v. Caruso Car Co./1 
where it was held that a contract was unenforceable because 
the buyer had given a promissory note that was included in 
the stated "cash" downpayment. In Highway Trailer, the 
court perceived that when the cash downpayment sum includes 
a postdated check, the danger of the buyer being misled as 
to the balance due is equal to the danger created when a 
promissory note is included in the stated cash downpayment, 
since the buyer would also have to make good at some future 
date. 
Because the court held the contract unenforceable on the 
above grounds, it did not have to consider the related issue 
of whether a currently dated check should be considered 
"cash" for purposes of section 2982. The court did state, 
however, that it would assume, without deciding, "that a cur-
rently dated check, drawn on an account having sufficient 
funds to pay it, is 'cash.' ,,12 Considering the supreme court's 
refusal to hold contracts unenforceable that suffer only from 
slight technical deficiencies/3 it would seem unlikely that any 
court would invalidate the common practice of supplying a 
currently dated check for payment. However, automobile 
sellers might place themselves in a more secure position by 
clearly indicating on the sales form that a check has been 
received in the transaction. 
Unruh Act14 
Prior to its amendment in 1967, section 1804.2 of the Civil 
Code stated that if a buyer did not give notice "of the facts 
giving rise to. [aJ claim or defense of the buyer,,15 
11. 166 Cal. App.2d 661, 333 P.2d 14. See Note, Installment Sales: Pur-
807 (1958). pose of the Unruh Act, 12 HASTINGS 
12. 250 Cal. App.2d at 736, 58 Cal. L. J. 312 (1961). 
Rptr. at 885. 15. Stats 1961, c. 1214, p. 2951 § 5. 
13. See Stasher v. Harger-Haldeman, 
58 Cal.2d 23, 22 Cal. Rptr. 657, 372 
P.2d 649 (1962). 
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within 15 days of request by an assignee of the seller, his 
rights must be cut off. Whether such a provision in fact 
gives any protection to the average consumer has long been 
questioned. As Professor Dunham has pointed out: 
Many people have commented on the incongruity of 
starting to solve a problem on the assumption that there 
is a group so ignorant that they cannot operate in the 
bargaining process, and then proceeding to protect these 
same people by creating more rights for them in court, 
or before administrative agencies, as to which they will 
be presumed equally, if not more, ignorant.I6 
One may similarly question whether the average consumer 
would reply to such a request by an assignee. Moreover, 
since most sellers will assign their contracts immediately, if 
they plan to assign at all, the buyer may not even be aware 
of defenses such as breach of warranty until after the IS-day 
period had elapsed. 
The 1967 amendment removes all burdens from the buyer 
and provides: 
An assignee of the seller's rights is subject to all claims 
and defenses of the buyer against the seller arising out 
of the sale notwithstanding an agreement to the con-
trary.17 
However, the amendment makes clear that if the assignee 
had no knowledge of the seller's noncompliance with the 
statute, the buyer's claim can only be asserted as a matter of 
defense, and then only to the extent of the debt owed to the 
assignee. 18 
Collection Procedures 
The extension of consumer credit also raises problems con-
cerning remedies thereby made available to the creditor or 
16. Dunham, Research for Uniform 18. See C.E.B., 1967 REVIEW OF 
Consumer Credit Legislation, 20 Bus. CODE LEGISLATION, pp. 34-35, for the 
LAW 997, at 1002-1003 (1965). possible meaning of a cross-reference to 
17. Cal. Civ. Code § 1804.2. Cal. Civ. Code § 1812.7. 
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his assignee. Wage garnishment, an attempt to collect the 
debt from the employer of the debtor, is one common remedy 
employed by creditors. Although this method has been under 
growing attack/9 the 1967 legislature was unable to effect 
any meaningful change. Numerous bills, however, were in-
troduced that would have exempted wages from attachment 
and execution;20 one of these bills would have virtually pre-
vented an employer from firing an employee because wages 
were garnished.1 At present, for all practical purposes, only 
50 percent of wages are exempt in California; this is the 
smallest exemption allowed in any of the 10 most populated 
states.2 
Minor amendments not specifically dealing with wage gar-
nishment, but dealing generally with execution and attach-
ment, were made to the Code of Civil Procedure. The exemp-
tion of an automobile was raised from a straight $350, to 
$350 "over and above all encumbrances" if the total value 
of the automobile is below $1,000. Similarly, a debtor may 
now exempt a housetrailer of the value of $2,500 above all 
encumbrances, if neither the debtor nor his spouse has another 
homestead.3 
Another amendment aids creditors by clearly allowing 
partial attachment.4 Thus, a creditor can now attach an 
asset that is worth less than the entire amount claimed and 
pay a bonding fee only for the amount attached, rather than 
for the entire amount of the claim. 
19. See Brunn, Wage Garnishment in 1. Assembly Bill 613 (1967). 
California: A Study and Recommenda- 2. See 53 CAL. L. REV. 1214, at 1215-
lions, 53 CAL. L. REV. 1214 (1965). 1223. 
20. See e.g., Assembly Bill 435 3. Cal. Code Civ. Proc § 690.24. 
(1967). 4. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 538-540. 
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